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 The conventional wisdom is that state ownership may hinder patenting 
through reduced incentives and pronounced agency problems associated with state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Empirical evidence from a variety of contexts, including 
the U.S., Europe, and China, is consistent with this view, including evidence that 
shows that reductions in state ownership are associated with an increase in patent 
counts. In this paper, we investigate the innovative efficiency of Chinese SOEs. 
Innovative efficiency refers to patents/R&D expenditure, and not patent counts. The 
data indicate that SOEs, and especially central government SOEs, are substantially 
more innovatively efficient than non-SOEs. The relative innovative efficiency of 
SOEs is more pronounced amongst firms with high financial constraints, those 
removed from financial centers, and those in high-technology industries. The data are 
consistent with the view that in the Chinese context, there are favorable benefits to 
state ownership through access to talent, connections, and technological resources that 
enables a sustained commitment to R&D to enable efficient patent outcomes relative 
to R&D expenditure.  
 
Keywords: State ownership, Innovative efficiency, Financial constraints 
JEL Codes: G32, G38, O31, O38 
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“China Pushes For Innovation In State-Owned Enterprises, But Is Change Possible?” 
- Forbes, August 22, 20161 
 
“China's desire to improve the efficiency of its state-owned enterprises is real, just 
don't expect the reform process to follow a western model.” 
- Bloomberg September 8, 20162 
 
1. Introduction 
State ownership is typically associated with less innovative efficiency. The 1980 
Bayh–Dole Act in the U.S. was introduced to transfer ownership of innovation from 
government to private parties (Eisenberg, 1996). There is much evidence from the U.S. 
and Europe that state ownership is a ‘dead hand’ with inefficient bureaucratic 
structures and reduced incentives to innovate (Eisenberg, 1996; Shleifer, 1998; 
Verspagen, 2006). 
China has recently become one of the world’s largest economies (Allen et al., 
2005) and the world’s leading generator of patents in the world (Ang et al., 2016). As 
China’s economy is dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), there is significant 
attentionamongst practitioners and academics alike as to whether or not these SOEs 
are innovatively efficient. Consistent with the government is a ‘dead hand’ 
perspective; evidence from China shows that partial transitions from state to private 
ownership in the 1990s (Jefferson et al., 2003) and 2000s (Tan et al. 2015) were 
associated with an increase in patent counts. 









In this paper, we revisit this general question of whether or not SOEs are good or 
bad for innovation by making use of data that not only count patents but also account 
for R&D expenditure. We use the “innovation efficiency” measure of Hirshleifer, Hsu, 
and Li (2013) and Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013) to examine whether or not 
SOEs in China possess more innovative efficiency. Prior research on patents in China 
(e.g., Jefferson et al., 2003; Choi et al., 2011; Tan et al., 2015) used samples where 
patents could not be matched to R&D expenditures. In this paper, we find differential 
evidence on the efficiency of SOEs for innovation. In particular, unlike prior work 
that suggests SOEs produce less innovation, we find that SOEs are more innovatively 
efficient than their non-SOE counterparts. 
In baseline regression results, we find a significantly positive association between 
SOEs and innovative efficiency. By using the Heckman MLE selection model, we 
rule out the potential selection bias due to the difference in size and age between 
SOEs and non-SOEs. Our further cross sectional tests are conducted to consider the 
differences in the impact of SOEs on innovative efficiency in subsamples partitioned 
according to standard proxies for financial constraints, including the WW index 
(Whited and Wu, 2006), the KZ Index (Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo, 2001), and 
firm size (market capitalization, Livdan, Sapriza, and Zhang, 2009). The data indicate 
that SOEs are even more innovatively efficient when compared to non-SOEs among 
firms with pronounced financial constraints.  
We run further subsample tests according to the location of the firms' headquarters, 
which proxy for the difficulties of the firms' financing. We define firms with 
headquarters in Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen as one group, with relatively easier 
access to finance,comparingthe rest of the firms as “other.”3 For those firms that with 
                                                             
3
 These cities ranked as the top 3 cities with the best financing environment in "Top 20 Cities with Best 
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headquarters not located in the top financial centers, the SOEs’ efficiency of 
innovative production is found to be significantly higher than the non SOEs’. This 
result suggests that for firms with more difficulties in accessingfinancing, SOEs are 
more innovatively efficient. For robustness, we also partition the sample into coastal 
areas and “other,” defined as whether their headquarters are located in the coastal 
provinces of China (15 of the "Top 20 Cities with Best Financial Environment in 
China" come from the coastal provinces).
4
We also employ the market index 
constructed by Fan et al. (2010) to compare the relatively developed area with more 
institutional environmentwith other developing provinces in China. Similar results 
hold. 
Also, we consider regressions to test the innovative efficiency of SOE versus non-
SOE firms under different market characteristics. Competitive product markets are a 
good external monitor for improving a firms' governance and increase managerial 
efforts (Schmidt, 1997; Bos, Economidou, and Sanders, 2013). Similarly, the high-
technology industry is competitive, and agency problem are often less than in other 
industries. We use product market competition levels and a high-technology industry 
dummy, respectively, and make them interact with the SOE dummy. The data indicate 
that the SOEs in more competitive markets and operating in high-tech industries tend 
to be moreinnovatively efficient than non-SOEs. 
Through what channel are SOEs more innovatively efficient in China? An 
important benefit of SOEs is the stable access to talent, financial resources, 
connections, and technological resources that enable a sustained commitment to R&D 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Financing Environment in China," from China Venture Capital and Entrepreneurship Research Center. 
4
 According to the report, "Top 20 Cities with Best Financing Environment in China" from China 
Venture Capital and Entrepreneurship Research Center, the top 20 cities, in order, are Beijing, 
Shenzhen, Shanghai, Suzhou, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Nanjing, Tianjing, Chengdu, Changsha, 
Shaoxin, Chongqing, Dongguan, Jinan, Changzhou, Ningbo, Xian, Fuzhou, and Xiamen. 
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to enable patent outcomes (Cumming, Rui, and Wu, 2016). China’s state sectors are 
the most important force in financing and carrying out research to spur innovations. 
SOEs in China are the most important innovators. For example, the newly-announced 
Nobel Prize winner Youyou Tu has proved to the world that the state sector can 
perform well in top innovative research. Ms. Tu’s invention of anovel therapy for anti-
malaria (which kills 200 million people each year) could not have been achieved 
inthree years without the Chinese government’s backing and involvement, not only in 
terms of funding but also in political support, the provision of research teams, and 
sample collections. Moreover, in China, mostuniversities belong to and are owned by 
the local government; several top schools, such as Peking University and Tsinghua 
University, are directly owned by the central government. Thus, it is much easier for 
the SOEs to cooperate with these universities for their top level research, and even 
work together with their super talents, with whom private firms usually have very few 
opportunities to meet. To this end, we also run tests by dividing SOEs into central 
SOEs and local SOEs, according to whether their ownership belongs to the central or 
local government. The data indicate that central SOEs have a more pronounced 
impact on innovative efficiency than local SOEs.  
Our paper contributes to the innovative efficiency and state ownership literature. 
We show for the first time in the literature that SOEs are more efficient than non-
SOEs in China, counter to prior evidence that examines patent counts in China 
without accounting for R&D expenses (Tan et al., 2015). Furthermore, we show that 
the superior innovative efficiency of SOEs is more pronounced among firms with 
higher financial constraints and those in more competitive product markets. In general, 
our paper highlights the importance of ownership and institutional features that jointly 
shape a corporation’sinnovative efficiency in an emerging market.  
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This paper continues as follows: Section 2 discusses the additional background 
and literature review; Section 3 explains the data andinnovative efficiency measures; 
Section 4 demonstrates the empirical results of the main findings;Section 5 provides 
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
Since 2005, China’s SOEs have been partially privatized SOEs.  China’s 
privatization is different from typical privatization practices around the world (Lipton 
et al., 1990; Boycko et al., 1994; Biais and Perotti, 2002). China adopted a partial 
privatization program in 2005 through which only a small percentage of shares float 
in the equity market. That is, although a great number of China's SOEs have been 
listed on the stock market, few are entirely privatized. The Chinese partial 
privatization program means that the government remains the largest shareholder. 
There are two main privatization waves in China: the Share Issue Privatization (SIP) 
and Split-Share Structure Reform (SSSR) (2005). SIP was launched in the early 1990s, 
when the Chinese government finished the establishment of two stock exchanges, the 
Shanghai and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The Chinese government managed to 
have a portion of the shared SOEs' to be listed on these two exchanges to be traded on 
the public market. Although a great proportion of shares were still non-publicly 
tradable during this privatization program; it was considered huge progress to the 
privatization process that switched the button from zero to one. Thus, all the publicly-
traded SOE shares can be considered as partially-privatized. China’s privatization 
approach is, therefore, gradual. The reform in China has progressed; the government 
dictates the reform with the aim to gradually introduce a significant but minor 
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percentage of public minority ownership traded in the stock market. Such partial 
privatization allows the Chinese government to retain a substantial portion of the 
ownership of partially-privatized SOEs, especially medium and large firms. In doing 
so, China adopted a strategy of “keeping the larger ones and letting go of the smaller 
ones.” Sun and Tong (2003) show that the share issue privatization (SIP), which is the 
first wave of privatization in China, is effective in improving an SOE’s earning ability, 
real sales, and worker productivity. Using China's secondary wave of privatization, 
Split-Share Structure Reform, Liao, Liu and Wang (2014) demonstrate that further 
privatization quickly boosted an SOE’s output, profits, and employment. Also, the 
reform improved corporate governance and share price informativeness (Hou et al., 
2012; Hou and Lee, 2014). 
The effect of privatization on corporate efficiency has been a central topic in the 
literature which has largely suggested efficiency improves after privatization. Most 
governments around the world, especially in developing countries, retain significant 
ownership of SOEs after they are listed through share-issue (so called “partial 
privatization”). For example, in a survey from 59 countries regarding their share issue 
privatization process, Jones et al. (1999) found that there are only 11.5% firms that 
had sold out all of their ownership to the public, and less than 30% of firms chose to 
sell more than half of their shares in the IPO. The supporters of partial privatization 
argue that the government should keep SOEs since they can play an important role in 
key industries, such as energy and transportation, and fulfill the government’s 
innovation policies. It is widely believed that SOEs lack efficiency (Megginson, Nash 
and Randenborgh, 1994). Empirical evidence shows that partial privatization 
improves firm performance and has casual effects on corporate efficiency. Supporting 
this view, Megginson and Netter (2001) document that the post-privatization 
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performance of most firms is better than pre-privatization performance. Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) and Claessens and Djankov (2002) found that newly privatized 
SOEs’ performance improves. 
A study by Tan, et al. (2015) shows that privatization of SOEs in China has a 
positive causal effect on firm innovation output. However, the challenge of measuring 
a firm’s innovation ability remains. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) argue that patents do not 
reflect productivity, because large corporations can invest more resources, such as 
research and development, and file larger numbers of patents than small firms. It is 
therefore still not clear from prior research whether SOEs are more efficient in 
converting investment or R&D expenses into innovative output. This is particularly 
important to determine, as it is well known that innovative investment has its own, 
unique features, such as high uncertainty, intangibility, and severe information 
asymmetry (Kumar and Langberg 2009; Hall and Lerner 2010). Innovation 
investment in SOEs is often plagued by agency problems, which means that SOEs’ 
innovative efficiency should be much worse than privately-owned enterprises. 
We thus rely on the measurement developed by Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) to 
examine the performance of investment on innovation. They propose the 
measurement of innovative efficiency—defined as the number of successful patent 
applications produced per unit of research expense—to better capture patent 
performance or the efficiency of transforming expenses into innovation outcomes. 
Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013) show this measure captures well the efficiency of 
converting R&D expenses into innovative outputs such as patents. We aim to answer 
the important question of whether SOEs are efficient after being partially privatized, 
compared to privately-owned enterprises withregard to their innovative investment 
and research expenditures.  
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There is scant literature regarding the SOEs’ efficiency in investment on 
innovation. The Chinese government, like all other countries’ governments, is 
increasingly promoting, encouraging, and investing in innovation through SOEs 
mainly, as the nation realizes that technological innovation is vital to a country’s 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1992) and economic growth (Solow, 1957; Baumol, 
2001). Governments commit a large number of funds to subsidize or incentivize 
corporate innovation of both SOEs and non-SOEs. SOEs, however, are often favored 
to receive such investment or grants from the government.  
On one hand, SOEs, compared to private owned firms, are more susceptible to 
agency problems due to lack of effective monitoring and incentives (Shleifer, 1998), 
and hence be less innovative efficient.  Incentives of efficiently investing in 
innovation may be jeopardized by such agency issues. Several additional channels of 
SOEs’ negative influence on efficiency exist, according to previous literature. 
Sappington and Stiglits (1987) find there is a lower transaction cost for the 
government to intervene in SOEs than private firms. More importantly, many papers 
point out that the "soft" budget constraints caused by states' unwillingness to let SOEs 
go bankrupt would lower the stimulating effect of financial constraints (Berglof and 
Roland 1998, Hessel and Rapaczynski 2000). Hansmann and Kraakmann (2000) 
suggest that governments may have other objectives for SOEs than profit or efficiency 
maximization. All these reasons would also impede innovative investment efficiency 
in the same way they hinder the operating efficiency. The inefficiency phenomenon is 
comprehensively summarized by Megginson and Netter (2001) and Megginson 
(2010). 
On the other hand, there are arguments supporting the innovative efficiency of 
SOEs.  Gupta (2005) argues that the stock market can monitor and provide incentives 
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to a management team of SOEs.Gupta (2005) argues that the stock market can 
monitor and provide incentives to a management team of SOEs. He finds that partial 
privatization has a positive impact on a firm’s profitability, productivity, investment, 
and efficiency. Almeida, Hsu, and Li (2013) show that financial constraints may 
contribute to a firm's efficiency of innovative activities by mitigating free cash flow 
problems,in which firms make unproductive R&D investments in fields out of their 
direct expertise. Thus, financial constraints, (e.g., lack of free cash flow and a 
mandated payment of dividend) all serve to reduce agency problems. SOEs with such 
features are as efficient as non-SOEs in innovation. Furthermore, external monitoring 
mechanisms also exist, such as product and technology market competition. SOEs 
operating in a high-tech sector or those facing intense product market competitionmay 
be as innovation efficient as non-SOEs..Megginson et al. (1994) also point out that 
partially private ownership allows for internalizing the benefits of performance 
improvements and that publicly-listed shares allow these benefits to be capitalized 
into the price of the firm's stock. These papers suggest that partial privatization leads 
to efficiency in SOEs. 
The Global Innovation Index (GII) conducted by Cornell University, the INSEAD 
Business School, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treats 
innovative efficiency as one of the most important components for innovation and 
economic development. High-ranking nations include not only developed countries 
with highly-privatized markets but also those countries that preserve a large portion of 
state-controlled enterprises and are newly partially privatized, such as Singapore and 
China. However, this innovative ranking of countries on the GII index, such as China, 
is somehow contradicted with the previous literature of SOEs' low efficiency. Hence, 
it is important to scrutinize the efficiency of SOEs regarding innovation, compared to 
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non-SOEs, since the government has the alternative of financing innovation through 
non-SOEs.  In view of the gap in the prior literature, and arguments both for and 
against the innovative efficiency of partially privatized SOEs, we examine for the first 
time below whether or not SOEs are more innovation efficient than their non-SOE 
counterparts in China. 
 
3. Data and Measurements 
There are 25,098 firm-year observations existing in the sample, including 11,589 
SOEs and 13,486 non-SOEs, from 1998to 2015. We exclude the financial and utility 
firms since they share different disclosure regulations, and their liquidity positions are 
different from the other firms. We also dropped and/or delisted firms, such as ST or 
*
ST, because they are under stricter regulations and trading requirements. We set the 
starting point as 2009, because, in 2007, Chinese firms adopted a new, unified set of 
accounting standards and principles, which requires firms to disclose R&D expense 
data.
5
 Since the calculation of innovative efficiency needs at least a firm’sprevious 3-
year average R&D Expense, our sample starts from 2009.  
Considering the impact of extreme values and outliers, we winsorize all firm 




 percentiles. To balance the sample and keep the same 
firms in each year, we require all the firms to have existedon the Shanghai or the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange for more than three years. Tan et al. (2015) point out that 
the firm ownership type (SOEs vs. non-SOEs) is an important determinant of firm 
innovation;therefore, we manually combined the firm ownership data from the 
CSMAR, the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) Database, and the Wind 
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 New Accounting Standards for Enterprises No.6 (Intangible Assets) required firms to identify, 






Database, as well as the official website of listed companies. All the patent data was 
hand-collected before 2014 from the State Intellectual Property Office of China 
(SIPO), which is directly affiliated with the China State Council and is responsible for 
registering intellectual property, including patents.Sincea truncation problem existed 
from SIPO, we also useddatabases fromtheChina Stock Market &the Accounting 
Research Database (CSMAR), as they disclosepatent numbers at the end of each year. 
Otherfinancial variableswere obtained from CSMAR. 
 
3.1 Innovation Efficiency Measurements 
According to the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, three types of 
patents are defined and filed with SIPO: invention patents (Type I), utility model 
patents (Type II), and appearance design patents (Type III). The invention patents 
(Type I) include new technical solutions to products, methodologies, or the 
improvement of producing a process, which is the most innovative type of patent and 
is similar to a U.S. utility patent. Type II patents include new technical ideas for a 
product’s shape and structure and aim for practical use, which does not reach the 
requirement for being as highly innovative as invention patents. The appearance 
design patents (Type III) include new designs for a product’s shape, pattern, and 
colorfulness, for the improvement of aesthetics, and an adaptation for industrial 
application. We obtained the information about the patent application date, application 
ID, publication ID, granting date, and patent ID, along with the names of inventors 
and applicants, in the SIPO database as well as in the patent database from CSMAR. 
In order to test how efficiently a firm transforms innovative input (R&D Expense) 
into innovative output (Patents), we follow Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) to 
construct a measurement of innovative efficiency, which is calculated as the number 
13 
 
of ultimately successful patent applications filed by firm i in year t (NumPati,t) 





XRDi,t-2),  (1) 
where XRDi,t indicates firm i’s R&D investment in year t. We only use the number of 
invention patents (Type I) as our main counts for the patent number (NumPati,t), 
because neither appearance design patents (Type III) nor practically new patents 
(Type II) has the same level of importance as the invention patents. The expenditure 
amount of the R&D investment for Type IIand Type III is obviously much lower than 
that for Type I, as well. 
For example, one of Tsingtao beer's Type 1 patent applications is named as "A 
biology method of systematically detecting contaminated bacteria," which needs 
around three years of timeto be implement, millions of dollars of investment, and an 
entire laboratory of research teams. In contrast, Type IIand Type III patents usually 
include projects like, "An invention of the package plate of glass bottle," and "A new 
design pattern for the stickers of beer bottles." 
Although these Type II and Type III patents are still essential to a firm’s 
marketing activities, the research expenditure on them is apparently much lower than 
that of the Type I patents. Therefore, merely keeping the Type I patents as the 
measurement setting can accurately and directly illustrate how efficiently firms 
transform their innovative input into real and essential innovative output. For 
robustness, we also consider alternative measures of innovative efficiency by 
including the other types of patents and setting different sample periods of R&D 
Expense. The results are similar, but the measurementsusing Type II or Type III 
patents have less magnitude and significance. These results are available upon request. 
One limitation and concern is the short sample period, due to the R&D expense 
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data availability, from 2009. For a robustness check, we substitute the R&D expense 
withintangible assets to construct the innovative efficiency measure by using the same 
calculation and find robust evidence. These results are also available upon request. 
Figure I plots the trend for the number of patents, the R&D expense, as well as 
the innovation efficiency measurement. There is a very clear increasing pattern for 
both patent number and R&D expense, indicating the importance and awareness of 
innovation in China. The number of patents from SIPO droppedsignificantly in 2014, 
suggesting a potential truncation issue.As for efficiency measurements, SOEs have 
generally higher innovative efficiency than non-SOEs in most years, although the gap 
is much closer in the most recent period. We also show that the number of patents 
divided by the XRD(lagged R&D expense) and the pattern is still similar. 
 
3.2 Data of SOEs and financial controls 
By following the existing literature (L. Liao et al. 2014 and M. Firth et al. 2010), 
we identify the ultimate controlled shareholder by tracing back the control chains of 
listed firmsby using the ownership structurefrom CSMAR. We further supplement the 
ownership data with WIND, CCER, and hand-collected data fromfirms’ annual 
reports for cases in which the ownership information is missing or incomplete from 
CSMAR. 
To be classified as an SOE, a listed company has to be ultimately controlled by a 
government entity,meaningacentral government, a local government, and/or other 
government agency, such as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC). Otherwise, we consider an SOE as a privately-controlled firm, 
such as a village or foreign company. We then identify the SOE Dummyto be equal to 
1, if a firm is an SOE in year t, and zero otherwise.  
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In the multivariate analysis, we control for an array of firm and industry-level 
characteristics that might affect a firm's innovative efficiency according to the 
literature. Hall and Ziedonis (2001), for example, argue that the number of patent 
applications and the number of patent citations are positively related to firm size. For 
this reason, we control for the firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets Ln (Assets). We also control forresearch and development expenses, divided by 
total firm assets, since R&D expenses play an essential role in financing firm 
innovation (Atanassov, 2013). Additionally, the following variables are considered: 
firm age, measured by years elapsed since the firm was first listed (Firm Age); 
profitability, measured by return on assets (ROA); growth opportunities, measured by 
Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q); the ratio of cash flow to total firm assets(Cash Flow); the debt-
to-assets ratio (Leverage); the rate of investment in fixed assets, measured by capital 
expenditures divided by total firm assets(CAPEX); the ratio of tangible assets divided 
by firm assets(Tangible); and product market competition, measured by the 
Herfindahl index of the level-2 industry code provided by the China Security 
Regulation Commission (CSRC), based on sales (Herfindahl Index). Table 1 provides 
a more detailed definition or calculation of the variables above. 
 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 summarizes the innovative efficiency and firm characteristics for SOE and 
private firms.In Panel A, the number of Type I patents from SIPO is higher than that 
from the CSMAR measurement, similar to the innovation efficiency measurement. 
Specifically,on average, SOEs have a mean of 0.1595 (SIPOdata; and .2164 with 
CSMAR data) of their efficiency for producing innovation, which means every one 
million CNY (around 160,000 USD) input of research and development expenses 
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would produce 0.1595 invention patent (Type I), while the average number of non-
SOEs is 0.1001 (SIPO data; and 0.1836 CSMAR data). The mean difference of 
innovative efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs is both economically and 
statistically significant. That is, on average, the SOEs are more efficient in producing 
innovation than the non-SOEs. This, however, may be caused by the size and age 
effect, since SOEs tend to be larger and older than private firms; there are other 
plausible reasons; e.g., SOEs hold less cash and possess a higher leverage ratio.  
 [INSERT TABLES 1-2 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
In additional unreported univariate tests, we compare the mean and medians of 
innovative efficiency for SOEs and non-SOEs according to the firm’s level of 
financial constraints measured by a KZ Index (Kaplan and Zingales, Lamont, Polk, 
and Saa-Requejo, 2001). Firms with a KZ Index above the 50th percentile are 
considered to be financially constrained, and, otherwise, financially unconstrained.
6
 
The univariate tests indicate that financially constrained SOEs have more efficiency in 
innovation than the private firms with financial constraints. Similarly, financially 
unconstrained SOE are less efficient in innovation than the financially unconstrained 
private firms. Those additional univariate results are available upon request. We 




4. Empirical Tests 
4.1 Baseline regressions 
                                                             
6
Same univariate tests are also conducted by using other measures as the proxy of financial constraint, 
such as the WW Index and the dividend payment status of firms, which produced similar results. 
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Table 3 reports the baseline multivariate regression results of the association 
between state ownership and the innovative efficiency during the post-privatization 
period. We use the panel regression controlled for both year and industry fixed effects 
to avoid unobserved year and industry invariant specific factors. The main 
independent variable is SOE Dummy, which equals one, if the firm's ultimate 
controlling ownership belongs to the state/local government throughout the sample 
period, and zero otherwise. All regressions are controlled for the natural logarithm of 
total assets, the firm age, the return on assets, Tobin's Q, cash flow, the leverage ratio, 
the R&D expense, capital expenditure (CAPEX) and tangible assets, the high 
technology dummy, market competition, and the industry SOE structure.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
As Table 3 shows, the estimated coefficient of the SOE signal is positive and 
significant. The number of patents invented by spending per million (CNY) R&D 
input of SOEs is 0.036 higher than the one of private firms (Column 1 for SIPO data). 
Given that the firms have an innovative efficiency average of 0.1244(Table 2), this 
means that SOEs are 28.9% more innovatively efficient than non-SOEs. Column (2) 
for CSMAR data indicates even greater economic significance with 
0.055/0.1970=27.9% greater innovative efficiency amongst SOEs than non-SOEs. 
The economic significance is more pronounced with propensity score matching in 
columns (3) and (4) for firm size and industry, while the Heckman regressions in 
columns (5) and (6) show slightly reduced economic significance. The greater 





4.2 Robustness checks 
[INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4 presents the regression results similar to those in Table 3. The focus of 






 Div Dummy, 
which all capture the variation between SOEs and non-SOEs regarding innovative 
efficiency when a firm’s level of financial constraint varies. Firms suffering from high 
financial constraints usually have a high KZ index, a high WW Index, and no 





are positive (as expected), and the coefficient of SOE
*
Div Dummy is negative
7
 
(although dividends are an imperfect signal of financial constraints). All the 
coefficients of interaction terms are statistically and economically significant. This 
finding supports our hypothesis that SOEs with morefinancial constraints are even 
more innovatively efficient than non-SOEs. 
Similar findings are shown in Table 5, where we segregate the sample by 
financially constrained and non-constrained firms, where the data clearly indicate that 
SOEs are substantially more innovatively efficient for financially constrained firms. 
The data in columns (1) and (2) indicate that SOEs are 46.4% more innovatively 
efficient for the subset of financially constrained firms as measured by the KZ index 
(while there is no difference between SOEs and non-SOEs for unconstrained firms). 
Columns (3) and (4) show that SOEs are 33.2% more innovatively efficient for the 
subset of financially constrained firms as measured by the WW index (and, as with 
the KZ index, there is no difference between SOEs and non-SOEs for unconstrained 
                                                             
7
The negative interation of a Dividend Dummy with anSOE Dummy indicates that SOEs with non-




firms under the WW index). Also, the data indicate in Table 4,Columns (5) and (6) 
that SOEs are 25.1% more innovatively efficient among the subset of non-dividend 
paying firms, and 21.9% more innovatively efficient among the subset of dividend 
paying firms. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 6 presents the OLS regression results for the difference of innovative 
efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs when dividing firms into two subsamples 
according to their headquarter location and by market conditions. In Column (1) and 
(2), subsamples are divided according to whether the headquarter location is in 
Beijing/Shanghai/Shenzhen or other cities, while Column (3) and (4) are divided by 
whether the headquarter location is along the coastal area or not. This is to test 
whether firms based in locations with poorer financing environments have differential 
innovative efficiency. Column (5) and Column (6) are divided by whether firms are 
located in the Special Economic Zone or not. and Column (7) and Column (8) identify 
the market development situation according to the local market index higher(lower) 
than the median of the market index by each year from Fan and Wang (2012). 
The research results in Columns (2),(4), (6), and (8) display the difference in 
innovative efficiency between SOE and non-SOEs and are statistically significant. 
The magnitudes of coefficients are economically large for SOEs in the poorer 
financing environments as well as in a more domestic,institutional setting.Coefficients 
in Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) being 0.050, 0.048, 0.037, and 0.041, respectively, 
means SOEs are 31.3%, 30.1%,23.2%, and 25.7%, respectively, more efficient in 
producing innovation than non-SOEs. Furthermore, the results in Column (1), (3),(5), 
and (7) show that there is no significant innovation efficiency difference between 
SOEs and non-SOEs in districts with a good financing environment. 
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[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 7 provides the results of the subsample test depending, on product market 
competition. We proxy the product market competition by using the Herfindahl Index 
(H-index) and group the firms according to the median of H-index. Firms with the H-
index above median are considered to be in low competitive markets and vice versa. 
This is to test how the difference between SOEs and non-SOEs in innovative 
efficiency would vary in a product market with different levels of competition. For 
robustness, we also test the interaction term SOE
*
Hindex, which captures the similar 
relationship between the SOES and innovative efficiency, according to the differential 
market competition.  
The results in Columns (1) and (2) for the different industry groups in Table 6 
demonstrate that the SOEs produce innovation with significantly more efficiency in 
both high and low competitive markets, although the economic significance is slightly 
greater in low competitive markets. When we consider the full sample and the 
interaction of SOE
*
Hindex, the effect is positive and economically significant for LV3 
and LV4 industries, suggesting SOEs are more innovatively efficient for more 
competitive industries.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 8 shows the results of similar regressions as Table 7 by dividing firms into 
high-technology industries and the rest. We adopt Hall and Lerner’s (2010) taxonomy, 
where the high-technology sector comprises pharmaceuticals, office and computing 
equipment, communications equipment, and electronic components. This is to test 
whether or not the difference between SOEs and non-SOEs varies when firms belong 





Hi-Tech, which capturesa similar relationship between the SOEs and innovative 
efficiency, according to the high-tech industries or not. The results in Columns (1), (2), 
and (3) demonstrate that the SOEs are significantly more innovatively efficient in 
high-technology industries than in non-high-technology industries, and the coefficient 
of SOE Signal and SOE
*
Hi-Tech is economically significant and large. For example, 
the coefficients of SOE Signal in Column (1) indicate that SOEs in high-technology 
industries are 32.0% (= 0.051 / 0.1595, when compared with the average efficiency of 
private firms) significantly more efficient in producing innovation than private firms. 
While for the firms in non-high-technology industries, there is no such significant 
relationship. In addition, the coefficient of SOE
*
Hi-Tech in Column (3) implies that 
SOEs are with more innovative efficiency in high-technology industries by 32.0%, in 
comparison with average firms.  
Overall, the results in Tables 7 and 8 provide compelling evidence from the 
industry aspect to support the argument that SOEs are more innovatively efficient, 
even in industries with high market competition and high technology. An 
interpretation is that the synergy of monitoring from both state and private 
shareholders with SOEs and competitive external markets enable SOEs to make 
optimal investment decisions and to be more creative in improving capital efficiency. 
Moreover, SOEs have better and more stable access to resources and talent that 
enables more efficient use of innovation expenditures. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
In order to prove this priority of SOEs in the process of grabbing investment 
projects, we launch another test, and the results are presented in Table 9. This test 
partitions all the SOEs into central government controlled firms (central SOEs) and 
local government controlled firms (local SOEs) using the dummy variable central 
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SOE, which equals one, if the firm’s ultimate ownership belongs to the central 
government of China, and zero otherwise. If the priority of SOEs substantially exists, 
conditional on the agency issue being mitigated by financial constraints, the central 
SOEs would obtain a higher quality of innovation investment projects and innovative 
talents due to their higher level of hierarchy, which will make central SOEs more 
efficient in their R&D investment activities than local SOEs. Table 8 Panel A indicates 
central SOEs are more innovatively efficient than local SOEs. The results of Table 9 
Panel B further show that central SOEs perform significantly better in innovative 
efficiency than local SOEs, for those firms with more financial constraints. For 
example, the coefficients of central SOES are 0.080, 0.111, and 0.069, which 
represent a50.1%, 69.6%, and 43.3%, respectively, higher innovative efficiency for 
financially constrained central SOEs than local SOEs. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 10 presents evidence similar to Table 5 with subsamples by year. The 
results are quite stable over each of the years, from 2010-2013, and consistent with 
those reported in Table 3. The results from 2009, however, are insignificant. 
[INSERT TABLES 11-13ABOUT HERE] 
We conduct additional robustness tests that are reported in Tables 11-13. In Tables 
11 and 12 we group firms into subsamples by dividing firms according to the 
characteristics related to Tobin’s Q, leverage, cash flow, tangible assets, intangible 
assets, capital expenditures, and cash holdings. The data indicate higher innovative 
efficiency among firms with high Tobin’s Q (with more growth options), high 
leverage, high intangible and tangible assets, and low cash flows and low cash 
holdings. All these findings substantially support the argument that among firms with 
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constrained access to capital in high-growth and high-tech sectors, SOEs are 
substantially more innovatively efficient than non-SOEs.  In Table 13 we include 
additional control variables for direct government subsidies.  The findings are 
likewise consistent with those discussed above. 
[INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 14 we report a difference-in-differences regression for a longer time period 
2002-2013 relative to the prior regression tables, but without R&D expenses because, 
as discussed above, R&D expenses are not available in China for these earlier periods.  
The data indicate, consistent with Tan et al. (2015), that partial privatization through 
the split share structure reform increased patent outputs amongst the SOEs.  But as 
discussed above, this evidence does not comment on the innovative efficiency of the 
firms.  In the period after partial privatization, the evidence shown above is strongly 





In this paper, we investigated whether SOEs are more innovatively efficient, with 
respect to patents per R&D expense, than non-SOEs in China during a time when 
SOEs were partly privatized. Also, we examined possible reasons for the comparative 
differences in innovation efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs by examining 
subsamples of the data. The data indicated that Chinese SOEs are more efficient in 
producing innovation than non-SOEs. The data further indicated that Chinese SOEs 
are particularly more innovatively efficient than non-SOEs among firms that are 
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relatively more capital constrained. Chinese SOEs are also more innovatively efficient 
in high-tech industries and industries with more pronounced product market 
conditions.Chinese SOEs appear to be able to make use of the benefits of state 
ownership through connections with public universities and access to talent and 
technology to bring about a sustained commitment to R&D and superior patent 
outcomes. 
Our empirical analysis of SOEs in China took place from 2009-2013, after which 
SOEs were partly privatized. We do not have a direct test of whether or not the partial 
privatization increased or decreased innovation efficiency in China due to the lack of 
R&D data in the pre-period. We only compare the innovation efficiency of SEO and 
non-SEOs in the post-partial privatization period. Further analyses could be carried 
out if R&D data became available for earlier periods. Likewise, further work might 
examine whether or not the results here are consistent in other countries. 
The evidence of the superior innovation efficiency of partly privatized SOEs in 
China relative to non-SOEs is pertinent to academics, industries, and policy makers. It 
is crucial for SOEs to improve their corporate governance and reduce agency issues 
by means of either internal incentive and constraints or external monitoring so as to 
take more advantage of partial privatization. Policy makers could be aware that partial 
privatization has its advantage by keeping the state’s controlling power athand. It is 
reasonable for partially privatized SOEs in their transition period to catch up with 
private firms in innovation because of these advantages. Besides this, the policy 
makers might also acknowledge that, in certain industries, especially industries of 
high product competition and high technology, the controlled portion of shares is 
necessary to promise an increase in efficiency.  
 Finally, for academia, our paper sheds light on the literature of privatization, 
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innovative efficiency, and corporate governance. The data support the argument that 
there are synergies between public and private ownership of Chinese SOEs in ways 
that facilitate innovative efficiency. In addition, this research also proves the link 
between a SOE’s priority and innovative efficiency, revealing that a state-controlled 




Allen, F., Qian, J., Qian, M. 2005. Law, finance, and economic growth in China. 
Journal of Financial Economics 77 (1), 57-116, 
Almeida, H., Hsu, P. H., and Li, D. 2013. Less is more: Financial constraints and 
innovative efficiency. Available at SSRN 1831786. 
Ang, J., Cheng, Y., and Chaopeng Wu, C., 2016. Does enforcement of intellectual 
property rights matter in China? Evidence from financing and investment choices in 
the high tech industry, Review of Economics and Statistics. forthcoming.  
Baumol, W. J., 2001. When is inter-firm coordination beneficial? The case of 
innovation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19(5), 727-737. 
Berglof, E., and Roland, G., 1998. Soft budget constraints and banking in transition 
economies. Journal of Comparative Economics, 26(1), 18-40. 
Biais, B., and Perotti, E., 2002. Machiavellian privatization. The American Economic 
Review, 92(1), 240-258. 
Bos, J.W.B., Economidou, C., Sanders, M.W.J.L. 2013. Innovation over the industry 
life-cycle: Evidence from EU manufacturing, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 86, 78-91. 
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W., 1994. Voucher privatization. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 35(2), 249-266. 
Choi, S.B., Lee, S.H., and Williams C., 2011 Ownership and firm innovation in a 
transition economy: Evidence from China, Research Policy, 40(3), 441-452. 
Claessens, S., and Djankov, S., 2002. Privatization benefits in Eastern Europe. Journal 
of Public Economics, 83(3), 307-324. 
Cohen, L., Diether, K., and Malloy, C., 2013. Misvaluing innovation. Review of 
Financial Studies, hhs183. 
Cumming, D., Rui, O., and Y. Wu, 2016. Political Instability, Access to Private Debt, 
and Innovation Investment in China, Emerging Markets Review, forthcoming. 
Dewenter, K. L., and Malatesta, P. H., 2001. State-owned and privately owned firms: 
An empirical analysis of profitability, leverage, and labor intensity. American 
Economic Review, 320-334. 
Eisenberg, E.S., 1996. Public research and private development: patents and 
technology transfer in government-sponsored research, Virginia Law Review,  
27 
 
Fang, G., Wang, X., & Zhu, H. (2010).Zhongguoshichanghuazhishu: 
Gediqushichanghuaxiangduijincheng 2011 nianbaogao (NERI Index of Marketization 
of China’s Provinces 2011 Report).  
Firth, M., Lin, C., and Zou, H., 2010. Friend or foe? The role of state and mutual fund 
ownership in the split share structure reform in China. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 45(03), 685-706. 
Gupta, N., 2005. Partial privatization and firm performance. The Journal of Finance, 
60(2), 987-1015. 
Hall, B. H., and Lerner, J., 2010. The financing of R&D and innovation. Handbook of 
the Economics of Innovation, 1, 609-639. 
Hall, B.H., Ziedonis, R., 2001. The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of 
patenting in the U.S. semiconductor industry, patenting in the U.S. semiconductor 
industry, 1979–1995. RAND Journal of Economics, 32 (1), 101–128. 
Hansmann, H., and Kraakman, R., 2000. The essential role of organizational law. Yale 
Law Journal, 387-440. 
Hirshleifer, D., Hsu, P. H., and Li, D., 2013. Innovative efficiency and stock returns. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 107(3), 632-654. 
Hou, W., and Lee, E., 2014. Split Share Structure Reform, corporate governance, and 
the foreign share discount puzzle in China, European Journal of Finance 20(7-9), 703-
727. 
Hou, W., Kuo, J.M., Lee, E., 2012. The impact of state ownership on share price 
informativeness: The case of the Split Share Structure Reform in China, The British 
Accounting Review 44 (4), 248-261. 
Jefferson, G., GZ Albert, G.Z., Xiaojing, G., Xiaoyun, Y. 2003. Ownership, 
performance, and innovation in China's large-and medium-size industrial enterprise 
sector, China Economic Review, 14(1) 89-113. 
Jones, S. L., Megginson, W. L., Nash, R. C., & Netter, J. M. (1999). Share issue 
privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 53(2), 217-253. 
Kumar, P., and Langberg, N., 2009. Corporate fraud and investment distortions in 
efficient capital markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 40(1), 144-172. 
Lamont, O., Polk, C., and Saa-Requejo, J., 2001. Financial constraints and stock 
returns. Review of Financial Studies, 14(2), 529-554. 
28 
 
Liao, L., Liu, B., and Wang, H., 2014. China׳ s secondary privatization: Perspectives 
from the split-share structure reform. Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), 500-
518. 
Lipton, D., Sachs, J., and Summers, L. H., 1990. Privatization in Eastern Europe: the 
case of Poland. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 293-341. 
Livdan, D., Sapriza, H., and Zhang, L., 2009. Financially constrained stock returns. 
Journal of Finance, 64(4), 1827-1862. 
Megginson, W. L., 2010. Privatization and finance. Available at SSRN 1544889. 
Megginson, W. L., and Netter, J. M., 2001. From state to market: A survey of 
empirical studies on privatization. Journal of Economic Literature, 321-389. 
Megginson, W. L., Nash, R. C., and Van Randenborgh, M., 1994. The financial and 
operating performance of newly privatized firms: An international empirical analysis. 
Journal of Finance, 403-452. 
Porter, M. E., 1992. Capital choices: Changing the way America invests in industry. 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5(2), 4-16. 
Sappington, D. E., and Stiglitz, J. E., 1987. Privatization, information and incentives 
(No. w2196). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Schmidt, K. M., 1997. Managerial incentives and product market competition. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 64(2), 191-213. 
Shleifer, A., 1998. State versus private ownership, Journal of Economic Perspectives 
12, 133-150. 
Solow, R. M., 1957. Technical change and the aggregate production function. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 312-320. 
Sun, Q., and Tong, W. H., 2003. China share issue privatization: the extent of its 
success. Journal of Financial Economics, 70(2), 183-222. 
Tan, Y., Tian, X., Zhang, X., & Zhao, H. (2015). The real effects of privatization: 
Evidence from China’s split share structure reform. Kelley School of Business 
Research Paper, (2014-33).Verspagen, B., 2006. University research, intellectual 
property rights and European innovation systems Journal of Economic surveys,  
Whited, T. M., and Wu, G., 2006. Financial constraints risk. Review of Financial 




Figure 1A: Innovation Efficiency for SOEs and non-SOEs over Time (2007 – 2015) 
This figure plots the firm-year, the level mean of firms (SOEs vs. non-SOEs),the number of successful Type I 













Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Innovation measures  
Patent1 Total number of invention patent (Type I) applications filed and 
eventually granted in a given year. One source is from the State 
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), and the other source is from China 
Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). 
 
Patent all Total number of invention patents (Type I), utility model patents (Type 
II), and appearance design patents (Type III) applications filed and 
eventually granted in a given year. One source is from the State 
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), and the other source is from the 
China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). 
 
Innovative Efficiency Innovative Efficiency (Hirschleifer, Hsu and Li, 2013) is calculated by 
taking the number of patents of firmi applied in year t, which eventually 
got granted, scaled by firm i’s cumulative R&D investment in the fiscal 
year ending in year t-2 through year t. 
  
Control variables  
Firm Size The logarithm of the book value of total assets measured at the end of 
fiscal year t. 
Firm Age The number of years the corporation has existed since getting listed. 
Tobin's Q The book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity scaled by the book value of total assets at the end 
of the fiscal year t. 
CAPEX  The capital expenditure divided by the book value of assets, measured at 
the end of fiscal year t-1.  
ROA The operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of 
total asset, measured at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Cash Flow The income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization 
divided by the book value of assets, measured at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Leverage  The book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets measured 
at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Tangibility The book value of property, plant, and equipment divided by the book 
value of total assets measured at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Intangibility The book value of intellectual property, including items such as patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, etc. divided by the book value of total assets 
measured at the end of fiscal year t-1.  
R&DIntensity The research and develop expenditure divided by the book value of assets, 
measured at the end of fiscal year t.  
Revenue Growth A firm’s level annual sales growth rate. 
Herfindahl Index Herfindahl index of 2-digit level-2 industry code, provided by the China 
Security Regulation Commission (CSRC), of each firm measured at the 
end of fiscal year t based on sales. 
High Tech Dummy Indicator of whether or not firms qualifiedfor the high-tech requirement 
created by the government and, thus, received benefits like a tax 
deduction at the end of year t. 
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SOE Dummy Indicator of whether or not the largest shareholder or the ultimate owner 
of the listed firms is state-owned at the end of year t. 
Industry SOE 
Structure 




Table 2: Summary Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of firms with innovation and firms characteristics data 
from1998to 2015. In Panel A, Columns (1) to (4) report the number of observations (N), mean, median, and 
standard deviation (S.D.) of the full sample. In Panel B, Columns (1) to (3) and (4) to (6) report the number of 
observations (N), mean,and standard deviation (S.D.) for subsamples of SOEs and non-SOEs,respectively. Column 
(7) reports the difference of mean for each variable between the two subsamples. In both Panels, the first variable 
is innovativeefficiency (Innov. Eff.) (Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li, 2013), which is defined by using the number of 
patent applications that areeventually granted divided by the R&D Expense of previous years. The other variables 
are the control variables: logarithm of total asset, firm age, Tobin’s Q, returns on asset (ROA), cash flow, leverage, 
tangible assets,intangible assets, R&D intensityrevenue growth, high-tech dummy,and capital expenditure 
(CAPEX).Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Table 1 and ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Full Sample         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable N Mean Median S.D 
Innovation Measures 
    Patent 1          25,098  4.0196 0.0000 17.6838 
Patent 1 (CSMAR)          25,098  6.7058 0.0000 28.1269 
Inno. Eff.          10,397  0.1244 0.0000 0.3837 
Inno. Eff. (CSMAR)          10,397  0.1970 0.0417 0.5163 
Key Variables 
    SOE Dummy          25,075  0.4622 0.0000 0.4986 
log(Total Assets)          23,340  21.3980 21.2443 1.2358 
Firm Age          25,093  11.5529 11.0000 5.6250 
Tobin's Q          24,237  2.3776 1.8495 1.7609 
CAPEX          23,340  0.0694 0.0448 0.0802 
ROA          21,073  0.0451 0.0394 0.0825 
Cash Flow          20,437  0.0790 0.0699 0.0836 
Leverage          23,274  0.2172 0.1901 0.1921 
Tangibility          23,340  0.3040 0.2680 0.1950 
Intangibility          23,340  0.0543 0.0347 0.0681 
R&D Intensity          10,974  0.0225 0.0172 0.0226 
Revenue Growth          21,050  0.2058 0.1270 0.5594 




Panel B: Subsample (SOE vs. Non-SOE)                   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 









    
 
N Mean S.D 
 
N Mean S.D 
 
Mean-Diff   T-test 
Patent Num          11,589  4.7064 20.6559 
 
         13,486  3.4327 14.6472 
 
1.2738 *** 5.69 
Patent Num (CSMAR)          11,589  7.1404 32.1201 
 
         13,486  6.3396 32.1201 
 
0.8008 ** 2.25 
Inno. Eff.            4,255  0.1595 0.4518 
 
           6,142  0.1001 0.3261 
 
0.0594 *** 7.79 
Inno. Eff. (CSMAR)            4,255  0.2164 0.5771 
 
           6,142  0.1836 0.4692 
 
0.0328 *** 3.19 
            
log(Total Assets)          11,078  21.7432 0.0127 
 
         12,240  21.0873 1.0418 
 
0.6559 *** 41.97 
Firm Age          11,584  11.5288 5.7101 
 





Tobin's Q          11,379  2.0557 1.3695 
 
         12,838  2.6616 2.0003 
 
-0.6060 *** -27.16 
CAPEX          11,078  0.0675 0.0788 
 
         12,240  0.0712 0.0815 
 
-0.0037 *** -3.47 
ROA          10,276  0.0420 0.0420 
 
         10,776  0.0481 0.0890 
 
-0.0061 *** -5.37 
Cash Flow          10,022  0.0771 0.0786 
 
         10,394  0.0808 0.0881 
 
-0.0037 *** 3.13 
Leverage          11,043  0.2305 0.1889 
 
         12,209  0.2047 0.1934 
 
0.0258 *** 10.26 
Tangibility          11,078  0.3359 0.2078 
 
         12,240  0.2754 0.1777 
 
0.0605 *** 23.94 
Intangibility          11,078  0.0511 0.0700 
 
         12,240  0.0570 0.0661 
 
-0.0059 *** -6.62 
R&D Intensity            4,138  0.0174 0.0208 
 
           6,836  0.0256 0.0230 
 
-0.0082 *** -18.73 
Revenue Growth          10,271  0.2009 0.5329 
 





High Tech Dummy          11,477  0.5360 0.4987            13,396  0.6441 0.4788   -0.1081 *** 17.42 
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Table 3: Main Regression, Propensity Score Matching, and Heckman MLE test 
In this table, columns (1) and (2) report the baseline results of the OLS regression to test the effect of state 
ownership on innovativeefficiency. Columns (3) and (4) report propensity score matching results for SOEs versus 
non-SOEs. While in columns (5) and (6), the results of the Heckman Selection MLE regressions are reported. The 
dependent variables in column (1), (3), and (5)areinnovativelyefficientbased in SIPO, while columns (2), (4), and 
(6) use CSMAR. Innovative efficiency is defined by using the number of patent applications that areeventually 
granted divided by the R&D Expense of previous years. The main independent variable is an SOE Dummy that 
equals one, if a firm’s ultimate controlling shareholders are the state or government agents in year t, and zero 
otherwise. It controls the logarithm of total asset, firm age, Tobin’s Q, return on asset (ROA), cash flow, leverage, 
tangible assets, capital expenditure (CAPEX), as well as year and level-2 industry code, provided by the China 
Security Regulation Commission (CSRC) andfixed effects for year and industry. For the selection variable 
regressions (5) and (6), the dependent variable is an SOE Dummy and the independent variable is Herfindahl 
Index, high-tech Dummy, and industry SOE structure, which equals the natural logarithm of (1 + number of SOEs 
in certain industry / total number of SOEs in certain industry). It also controls for both industry and year fixed 
effect.Standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported in parentheses. Detailed definitions of each 
variable are provided in the Table 1 and ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Innov. Eff. Innov. Eff. 
(CSMAR) 
Innov. Eff. Innov. Eff. 
(CSMAR) 
Innov. Eff. Innov. Eff. 
(CSMAR) 
 
OLS OLS (PSM) Heckman 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOE Dummy 0.036*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.076*** 0.279*** 0.279*** 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.019* 0.008 0.012 0.021 0.021* 0.011 
 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) 
Log(Total 
Assets) -0.010** -0.035*** -0.013** -0.038*** -0.008* -0.033*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Lag(Tobin's Q) -0.007** -0.011*** -0.006* -0.008* -0.007* -0.011** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
SalesGrowth -0.013 -0.019 -0.023* -0.041*** -0.013 -0.018 
 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) 
ROA -0.507* -0.015 -0.274 0.047 -0.515 -0.027 
 
(0.303) (0.380) (0.311) (0.437) (0.334) (0.433) 
Cash Flow 0.358 -0.276 0.238 -0.265 0.362 -0.271 
 
(0.298) (0.382) (0.313) (0.441) (0.326) (0.424) 
Tangibility -0.111** -0.037 -0.106** -0.069 -0.111*** -0.037 
 
(0.043) (0.058) (0.042) (0.061) (0.041) (0.053) 
Leverage 0.205*** 0.190*** 0.232*** 0.235*** 0.205*** 0.189*** 
 
(0.043) (0.052) (0.046) (0.057) (0.030) (0.039) 
High Tech 
Dummy 0.044*** 0.059*** 0.031*** 0.060*** 0.038*** 0.050*** 
 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) 
Herfindahl 
Index 0.269 0.192 -0.131 -0.059 0.219 0.115 
 




Structure 0.107 -0.006 -0.313 -0.379 1.370** 1.928** 
 
(0.688) (0.674) (1.027) (1.126) (0.679) (0.882) 
Constant 0.305 0.889 0.800 1.371 -1.043* -0.789 
 
(0.642) (0.634) (0.934) (1.034) (0.551) (0.716) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Selection Model       SOE Dummy 
High Tech Dummy 
   
0.059*** 0.059*** 
     
(0.020) (0.020) 
Herfindahl Index 
   
0.078 0.078 
     
(0.097) (0.097) 
Industry SOE Structure 
   
-11.941*** -11.941*** 
     
(0.177) (0.177) 
Constant 
    
10.185*** 10.185*** 
     
(0.158) (0.158) 
N 8178 8178 7074 7074 22448 22448 
adj. R-sq 0.071 0.043 0.069 0.047 





Table 4: Main Regressionwith Different Financial Constraints Variables 
This table reports the estimation results of regressions designed to measure the effect of state ownership on 
innovation efficiency for firms with different financial constraints. We regress firm innovation efficiency in year t 
on an SOE Dummy variable that equals one, if a firm’s ultimate controlling shareholders are the state or 
government agents in year t, and zero otherwise, and the product of the SOE Dummy variable with three different 
proxiesof financial constraints (theKZ Index, the WW Index,and the Dividend Dummy) for each firm in each 
year.The Dividend Dummy equals to one, if firms pays dividend to the shareholder at the given year. The 
dependent variables are the innovativeefficiency. All regressions control for the logarithm of total asset, firm age, 
Tobin’s Q, return on asset (ROA), cash flow, leverage, tangible assets, and capital expenditure (CAPEX), high-tech 
dummy, Herfindahl index, industry SOE structure as well as year and level-2 industry code, provided by the China 
Security Regulation Commission (CSRC), fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the 
Table 1. Standard errors clustered at theindustry level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Innovative Efficiency 
  (1) (2) (3) 
SOE Dummy 0.013 0.292** 0.057*** 
 
(0.013) (0.147) (0.014) 




















 SOE*Div Dummy 
  
-0.032* 





   
(1.701) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.019** 0.022** 0.018* 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.008* 0.014* -0.009** 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) 
Lag(Tobin's Q) -0.011** -0.007* -0.007** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
SalesGrowth -0.007 0.008 -0.016 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
ROA -0.488 -0.491 -0.442 
 
(0.303) (0.302) (0.299) 
Cash Flow 0.323 0.408 0.340 
 
(0.291) (0.298) (0.298) 
Tangibility -0.113** -0.113*** -0.101** 
 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
Leverage 0.164*** 0.213*** 0.192*** 
 
(0.041) (0.043) (0.042) 
High Tech Dummy 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
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Herfindahl Index 0.304 0.236 0.241 
 
(0.233) (0.223) (0.226) 
Industry SOE Structure 0.232 -0.032 0.028 
 
(0.693) (0.687) (0.665) 
Constant 0.204 -0.024 0.361 
 
(0.645) (0.598) (0.622) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
N 8001 8178 8047 




Table 5: Financial Constraint Subsets 
This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining the effect of state ownership on innovation efficiency for firms with different financial constraints. We use the KZ 
index, the WW Index, and the Dividend Dummy as three proxies for the financial constraint. Column (1), (3), and (5) include all financially constrained subsamples, defined as firms with a KZ 
index above median, a WW Index above median, and firms that do not pay dividend, respectively. While column (2), (4), and (6) include all financial unconstrained subsamples, defined as firms 
with a KZ index below median, a WW Index below median, and firms that pay dividend, respectively. The dependent variable is the innovation efficiency; the main explanatory variable is an 
SOE Dummy. The regressions control for the logarithm of total asset, firm age, Tobin’s Q, return on asset (ROA), cash flow, leverage, tangible assets, and capital expenditure (CAPEX), high-
tech dummy, Herfindahl index, industry SOE structure as well as year and level-2 industry code, provided by the China Security Regulation Commission (CSRC), fixed effects. Detailed 
definitions of each variable are provided in the Table 1. . Standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  Innovative Efficiency 
 
KZ Index WW Index Dividend Dummy 
 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOE Dummy 0.074*** -0.002 0.053*** 0.026** 0.040** 0.035** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.016 0.025** 0.023 0.025** 0.035*** 0.012 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.017** 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.013* -0.002 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Lag(Tobin's Q) -0.013*** -0.004 -0.009** -0.005 -0.013*** -0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
SalesGrowth -0.028* 0.015 0.022 -0.018 -0.019 -0.005 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.029) (0.015) (0.014) (0.023) 
ROA -1.120** 0.373 0.209 -0.863** -0.513 -0.231 
 
(0.461) (0.394) (0.527) (0.366) (0.355) (0.553) 




(0.454) (0.354) (0.509) (0.369) (0.348) (0.547) 
Tangibility -0.168*** 0.005 -0.124* -0.103* -0.199*** 0.036 
 
(0.060) (0.062) (0.064) (0.059) (0.053) (0.078) 
Leverage 0.256*** 0.068 0.265*** 0.184*** 0.238*** 0.158** 
 
(0.063) (0.052) (0.073) (0.053) (0.058) (0.063) 
High Tech 
Dummy 0.021 0.069*** 0.030 0.054*** 0.031* 0.055*** 
 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) 
Herfindahl Index -0.123 0.760** 0.302 0.129 0.239 0.336 
 
(0.357) (0.319) (0.298) (0.298) (0.227) (0.425) 
Industry SOE 
Structure 2.000* -1.200 -0.095 -0.256 0.021 -0.097 
 
(1.100) (0.927) (1.131) (0.862) (1.126) (0.867) 
Constant -1.266 1.337 0.016 0.189 0.545 0.303 
 
(0.991) (0.885) (0.991) (0.767) (1.042) (0.822) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4202 3799 4033 4145 5074 3104 





Table 6: Location and Market Condition Subsamples 
This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining the effect of state ownership on innovation efficiency for firms with different headquarter locations, and by market 
conditions. Column (1) and (2) include firms with headquarters located in Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenzhen, and others. While column (3) and (4) include firms with headquarters located in the 
coastal area and others. Columns (5) and (6) present subsets by firms with headquarters in a special economic zone and others. Columns (7) and (8) present subsets by high market index vs. low 
market index respectively.The dependent variable is the innovation efficiency; the main explanatory variable is an SOE Dummy. The regressions control for the logarithm of total assets, firm 
age, Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), cash flow, leverage, tangible assets, and capital expenditure (CAPEX), high-tech dummy, Herfindahl index, industry SOE structure as well as year and 
level-2 industry code, provided by the China Security Regulation Commission (CSRC), fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Table 1. . Standard errors clustered 
at the industry level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%,and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Innovative Efficiency 
 
SH&BJ&SZ Coastal Special Economic Zone Market Index 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Yes No Yes No Yes No High Low 
SOE Dummy -0.029 0.050*** 0.019 0.048*** 0.012 0.037*** 0.022 0.041** 
 
(0.022) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.028 0.014 0.010 0.023 0.010 0.022** 0.005 0.022 
 
(0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) (0.024) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.009 -0.008 -0.012** -0.006 -0.014* -0.008 -0.016*** -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) 
Lag(Tobin's Q) -0.012** -0.005 -0.009** -0.005 -0.010* -0.005 -0.004 -0.008 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
SalesGrowth -0.013 -0.014 -0.005 -0.021 -0.002 -0.016 0.007 -0.039* 
 
(0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) 
ROA -0.931** -0.086 -1.081*** 0.224 0.388 -0.371 -0.807* -0.592 
 
(0.457) (0.381) (0.362) (0.504) (0.601) (0.355) (0.468) (0.553) 




(0.425) (0.378) (0.338) (0.511) (0.565) (0.353) (0.444) (0.546) 
Tangibility 0.026 -0.116** -0.142*** -0.064 0.052 -0.130** -0.160** -0.111 
 
(0.068) (0.053) (0.053) (0.064) (0.074) (0.051) (0.065) (0.080) 
Leverage 0.102 0.225*** 0.045 0.271*** -0.009 0.255*** 0.150** 0.277*** 
 
(0.075) (0.050) (0.054) (0.061) (0.060) (0.052) (0.065) (0.071) 
High Tech Dummy 0.035 0.041*** 0.033* 0.041** 0.009 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.030 
 
(0.025) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) 
Herfindahl Index 0.674 0.063 0.541* 0.028 0.555 0.156 0.572* -0.142 
 
(0.445) (0.252) (0.279) (0.363) (0.449) (0.259) (0.325) (0.308) 
Industry SOE 
Structure 
-0.552 0.347 0.329 -0.604 -1.438 0.490 0.445 -0.901 
 
(1.381) (0.759) (0.940) (1.012) (1.600) (0.701) (1.022) (0.896) 
Constant 0.885 0.061 0.186 0.819 1.929 -0.038 0.191 0.980 
 
(1.301) (0.702) (0.861) (0.953) (1.491) (0.651) (0.942) (0.849) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1787 6391 3636 4542 1945 6233 3360 3273 





Table 7: Market Competition 
This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining the effect of state ownership on innovation efficiency for firms in a product market with different levels of 
competition in different industry categories. Herfindahl Index (H-Index) is used to proxy for the product market competition. Firms with H-Index lower than the median are considered in the 
high competitive product market while the other in the low competitive product market. These two groups are included in column (1) and (2), respectively. While column (3) uses the full sample 
and addsthe variable Hindex and the interaction term SOE*Hindex. The dependent variable is the innovativeefficiency; the main explanatory variable is an SOE Dummy for column (1) and (2) 
and SOE*Hindex for column (3). The dependent variable is the innovation efficiency; the main explanatory variable is an SOE Dummy. The regressions control for the logarithm of total asset, 
firm age, Tobin’s Q, return on asset (ROA), cash flow, leverage, tangible assets, and capital expenditure (CAPEX), high-tech dummy, industry SOE structure as well as year and level-2 industry 
code, provided by the China Security Regulation Commission (CSRC), fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Table 1. . Standard errors clustered at the industry 
level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  LV1 Industry LV2 Industry LV3 Industry LV4 Industry 


















  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
SOE Dummy 0.028** 0.047** 0.038*** 0.031* 0.045*** 0.037*** 0.021 0.060*** 0.016 0.033** 0.040** 0.019 
 




































Age) 0.021* 0.014 0.019* 0.027 0.010 0.019* 0.008 0.034*** 0.019** 0.007 0.036** 0.018* 
 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) 
Log(Total 
Assets) -0.008 -0.010 -0.010** -0.008 -0.011** -0.010** -0.012 -0.007 -0.011** -0.019*** -0.002 -0.010** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 





(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
SalesGrowth -0.002 -0.021 -0.013 0.006 -0.029** -0.013 -0.007 -0.021 -0.014 -0.018 -0.010 -0.014 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.013) 
ROA -0.673 -0.407 -0.500* -0.527 -0.460 -0.508* -0.487 -0.457 -0.489 -0.328 -0.633 -0.505* 
 
(0.474) (0.386) (0.304) (0.463) (0.395) (0.303) (0.460) (0.386) (0.303) (0.509) (0.386) (0.303) 
Cash Flow 0.513 0.244 0.354 0.282 0.415 0.360 0.309 0.343 0.340 0.194 0.468 0.354 
 
(0.487) (0.356) (0.299) (0.471) (0.371) (0.298) (0.467) (0.363) (0.298) (0.515) (0.363) (0.299) 




(0.055) (0.075) (0.044) (0.063) (0.059) (0.043) (0.062) (0.061) (0.043) (0.063) (0.064) (0.044) 
Leverage 0.157*** 0.279*** 0.205*** 0.156** 0.262*** 0.205*** 0.184*** 0.234*** 0.208*** 0.240*** 0.186*** 0.205*** 
 
(0.050) (0.078) (0.043) (0.064) (0.055) (0.043) (0.061) (0.060) (0.043) (0.061) (0.061) (0.043) 
High Tech 
Dummy 0.026* 0.074*** 0.043*** 0.028 0.064*** 0.044*** 0.022 0.073*** 0.045*** 0.023 0.061*** 0.043*** 
 
(0.015) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) (0.012) 
Industry 
SOE 
Structure -0.406 -0.663 0.093 0.224 0.211 0.107 -0.403 -0.018 0.084 -0.668 0.512 0.116 
 
(1.224) (1.021) (0.689) (1.125) (0.966) (0.688) (0.983) (1.162) (0.684) (1.037) (0.916) (0.686) 
Constant 0.821 0.973 0.327 0.187 0.234 0.303 0.932 0.345 0.375 1.271 -0.193 0.332 
 
(1.173) (0.943) (0.643) (1.044) (0.887) (0.642) (0.916) (1.072) (0.640) (0.962) (0.860) (0.640) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5038 3140 8178 3988 4190 8178 4453 3725 8178 4438 3740 8178 
adj. R-sq 0.077 0.067 0.070 0.072 0.067 0.071 0.077 0.068 0.071 0.075 0.074 0.071 
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Table 8: High-Technology Industry 
This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining the effect of state ownership on 
innovation efficiency for firms in high-tech industries or not. We adopt Hall and Lerner’s (2010) taxonomy where 
the high-technology sector comprises pharmaceuticals, office and computing equipment, communications 
equipment, and electronic components. Column (1) and (2) include firms in high-tech industries and non-high-tech 
industries, respectively. While column (3) uses the full sample to do difference-in-difference test by adding the 
variable High-Tech Dummy and the interaction term SOE*Hi-Tech. The dependent variable is the innovation 
efficiency; the main explanatory variable is an SOE Signal for column (1) and (2) and SOE*High-Tech for column 
(3). The dependent variable is the innovation efficiency; the main explanatory variable is an SOE Dummy. The 
regressions control for the logarithm of total asset, firm age, Tobin’s Q, return on asset (ROA), cash flow, leverage, 
tangible assets, and capital expenditure (CAPEX), Herfindahl index, industry SOE structure as well as year and 
level-2 industry code, provided by the China Security Regulation Commission (CSRC), fixed effects. Detailed 
definitions of each variable are provided in the Table 1. . Standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Innovative Efficiency 
 
High Tech non High Tech Full 
 (1) (2) (3) 
SOE Dummy 0.051*** 0.021 0.026 
 









   
(0.015) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.023** 0.007 0.018* 
 
(0.011) (0.019) (0.009) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.018*** -0.009 -0.010** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Lag(Tobin's Q) -0.008* -0.010* -0.007** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
SalesGrowth -0.003 -0.019 -0.013 
 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.013) 
ROA 0.550 -1.625*** -0.505* 
 
(0.382) (0.557) (0.303) 
Cash Flow -0.586 1.382** 0.358 
 
(0.367) (0.556) (0.298) 
Tangibility -0.052 -0.193*** -0.111** 
 
(0.056) (0.072) (0.043) 
Leverage 0.219*** 0.216*** 0.205*** 
 
(0.054) (0.074) (0.043) 
Herfindahl Index 0.166 0.485 0.267 
 
(0.304) (0.302) (0.221) 
Industry SOE Structure -0.792 0.957 0.092 
 
(0.978) (0.919) (0.688) 
Constant 1.411 -0.422 0.323 
 
(0.903) (0.858) (0.642) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
N 5434 2744 8178 
adj. R-sq 0.092 0.048 0.071 
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Table 9: Central-Government Owned Subsample 
This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining the effect of central government 
ownership on innovation efficiency for firms with different financial constraints. We use the KZ index, the WW 
Index, and the logarithm of total assets as three proxies for the financial constraint. Panel A reports the full sample. 
Panel B considers subsamples. In Panel B, columns (1), (3), and (5) include all financial constrained subsamples, 
defined as firms with a KZ index above median, a WW Index above median, and non-dividend payers, respectively. 
Panel B columns (2), (4), and (6) include all financial unconstrained subsamples, defined as firms with a KZ index 
below median, a WW Index below median, and non-dividend payers, respectively. The dependent variable is the 
innovation efficiency; the main explanatory variable is an SOE Signal for column (1) and (2) and SOE*High-Tech 
for column (3). The dependent variable is the innovation efficiency; the main explanatory variable is an SOE 
Dummy. The regressions control for the logarithm of total asset, firm age, Tobin’s Q, return on asset (ROA), cash 
flow, leverage, tangible assets, and capital expenditure (CAPEX), Herfindahl index, industry SOE structure as well 
as year and level-2 industry code, provided by the China Security Regulation Commission (CSRC), fixed effects. 
Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Table 1. . Standard errors clustered at industry level are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A : Full Sample Innovative Efficiency 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Central-SOE Dummy 0.016 0.651*** 0.084*** 
 
(0.021) (0.200) (0.024) 






































Log(Firm Age) 0.024*** 0.023** 0.022** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.007 0.014* -0.007 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) 
Lag(Tobin's Q) -0.012*** -0.007** -0.008** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
SalesGrowth -0.007 0.006 -0.016 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
ROA -0.492 -0.520* -0.482 
 
(0.305) (0.305) (0.303) 
Cash Flow 0.312 0.417 0.370 
 
(0.292) (0.298) (0.300) 




(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
Leverage 0.166*** 0.212*** 0.193*** 
 
(0.041) (0.043) (0.042) 
High Tech Dummy 0.043*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Herfindahl Index 0.306 0.235 0.234 
 
(0.234) (0.226) (0.228) 
Industry SOE Structure 0.262 -0.018 0.077 
 
(0.690) (0.686) (0.666) 
Constant 0.126 -0.046 0.287 
 
(0.644) (0.596) (0.624) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
N 8001 8178 8047 
adj. R-sq 0.072 0.073 0.067 
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 Panel B: Subsample Innovative Efficiency 
 
KZ Index WW Index Dividend Dummy 
 
constrained unconstrained constrained unconstrained non dividend payer dividend payer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Central-SOE Dummy 0.080*** 0.027 0.111*** 0.026 0.069*** 0.039 
 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.034) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.028* 0.024** 0.024* 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.019 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.014* -0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.011 -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Lag(Tobin's Q) -0.013*** -0.005 -0.010** -0.005 -0.013*** -0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
SalesGrowth -0.028* 0.014 0.021 -0.017 -0.020 -0.004 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.028) (0.016) (0.014) (0.023) 
ROA -1.165** 0.397 0.229 -0.903** -0.548 -0.248 
 
(0.466) (0.400) (0.526) (0.372) (0.359) (0.558) 
Cash Flow 1.050** -0.664* -0.400 0.789** 0.357 0.119 
 
(0.456) (0.359) (0.507) (0.372) (0.349) (0.550) 
Tangibility -0.170*** 0.008 -0.110* -0.105* -0.198*** 0.036 
 
(0.060) (0.062) (0.064) (0.060) (0.053) (0.078) 
Leverage 0.257*** 0.069 0.265*** 0.182*** 0.240*** 0.152** 
 
(0.063) (0.052) (0.072) (0.053) (0.058) (0.063) 
High Tech Dummy 0.017 0.069*** 0.023 0.053*** 0.028* 0.054*** 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) 
Herfindahl Index -0.148 0.772** 0.300 0.116 0.251 0.299 
 
(0.355) (0.319) (0.307) (0.298) (0.230) (0.426) 
Industry SOE Structure 2.095* -1.238 -0.062 -0.263 0.081 -0.106 
 
(1.097) (0.924) (1.125) (0.865) (1.120) (0.870) 
Constant -1.424 1.419 -0.015 0.176 0.447 0.298 
 
(0.991) (0.877) (0.986) (0.771) (1.035) (0.829) 
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Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4202 3799 4033 4145 5074 3104 
adj. R-sq 0.063 0.094 0.074 0.073 0.079 0.062 
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Table 10: Cross-Year Test 
This table reports the estimation results of subsample cross sectional regressions examining the effects of state ownership on innovation efficiency across years during 2009 – 2013 for firms 
with different financial constraints. All the control variables are omitted to be concise. We use the KZ index, the WW Index, and a Dividend Dummy as three proxies for the financial constraint. 
Column (1), (3), and (5) include all financially constrained subsamples, defined as firms with a KZ index above median, a WW Index above median, and firms do not pay dividend, respectively. 
While column (2), (4), and (6) include all financial unconstrained subsamples, defined as firms with a KZ index below median, a WW Index below median, and firms pay dividend, respectively. 
The dependent variable is the innovation efficiency; the main explanatory variable is an SOE Dummy. The regressions control for the logarithm of total assets, firm age, Tobin’s Q, return on 
asset (ROA), cash flow, leverage, tangible assets, and capital expenditure (CAPEX), high-tech dummy, Herfindahl index, industry SOE structure,as well as year and level-2 industry code, 
provided by the China Security Regulation Commission (CSRC), fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Table 1. . Standard errors clustered at industry level are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Innovative Efficiency 
 
KZ Index WW Index Dividend Dummy 
 
constrained unconstrained constrained unconstrained non dividend payer dividend payer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year 2009 (Obs: 1,478) 
      SOE Dummy -0.009 0.004 0.038 0.001 -0.019 0.066 
 
(0.091) (0.083) (0.087) (0.092) (0.082) (0.101) 
Central-SOE Dummy -0.047 0.016 0.020 -0.014 -0.066 0.107 
 
(0.115) (0.092) (0.125) (0.086) (0.099) (0.107) 
Year 2010 (Obs: 1,828) 
      SOE Dummy 0.202*** 0.031 0.141** 0.098** 0.125** 0.107* 
 
(0.053) (0.055) (0.063) (0.045) (0.055) (0.055) 
Central-SOE Dummy 0.172* 0.087 0.283** 0.043 0.215** 0.058 
 
(0.089) (0.075) (0.123) (0.057) (0.091) (0.080) 
Year 2011 (Obs: 2,063) 
      SOE Dummy 0.118** 0.042 0.186*** 0.033 0.142*** 0.027 
 
(0.050) (0.038) (0.061) (0.045) (0.051) (0.049) 




(0.075) (0.048) (0.093) (0.057) (0.061) (0.078) 
Year 2012 (Obs: 2,191) 
      SOE Dummy 0.080*** 0.005 0.063* 0.039 0.058** 0.036 
 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.034) (0.025) (0.027) (0.031) 
Central-SOE Dummy 0.116** -0.013 0.080* 0.060 0.093** 0.031 
 
(0.052) (0.025) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) 
Year 2013 (Obs: 2,239) 
      SOE Dummy 0.097*** 0.018 0.072* 0.051** 0.067** 0.041* 
 
(0.030) (0.025) (0.038) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) 
Central-SOE Dummy 0.111* 0.008 0.133* 0.050 0.111* 0.032 
 
(0.058) (0.040) (0.075) (0.046) (0.057) (0.050) 




Table 11: Subsets of Firms by Financial Measures 
This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining effects of state ownership on 
innovation efficiency for firms with firm characteristics regarding agency issue. Columns (1), (3), and (5) include 
all subsample firms with high (above median) Tobin’s Q, high leverage, and high cash flow. While columns (2), 
(4), and (6) include all subsample firms with low (below median) Tobin’s Q, low leverage, and low cash flows. 
The dependent variable is the innovativeefficiency; the main explanatory variable is an SOE Dummy. The 
regressions control for the logarithm of total asset, firm age, Tobin’s Q, return on asset (ROA), cash flow, leverage, 
tangible assets, and capital expenditure (CAPEX), high-tech dummy, Herfindahl index, industry SOE structure,as 
well as year and level-2 industry code, provided by the China Security Regulation Commission (CSRC), fixed 
effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Table 1. . Standard errors clustered at industry 
level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Innovative Efficiency 
 
Tobin Q Leverage Cash Flow 
 
High Low High Low High Low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOE Dummy 0.058*** 0.012 0.039** 0.032** 0.025* 0.054*** 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.002 0.045*** 0.007 0.032*** 0.001 0.029* 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.015** -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.001 -0.017** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Lag(Tobin's Q) -0.011*** 0.010 -0.006 -0.007** -0.011** -0.009 
 
(0.004) (0.030) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
SalesGrowth -0.022* 0.004 -0.020 0.000 -0.022 -0.009 
 
(0.014) (0.025) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) 
ROA -0.147 -1.307** -1.015** 0.403 -0.144 -1.193 
 
(0.346) (0.599) (0.432) (0.455) (0.308) (0.789) 
Cash Flow 0.056 0.991* 0.768* -0.501 0.173 0.621 
 
(0.354) (0.556) (0.404) (0.470) (0.318) (0.837) 
Tangibility -0.011 -0.248*** -0.164*** 0.031 -0.075 -0.172** 
 
(0.058) (0.071) (0.058) (0.063) (0.056) (0.073) 
Leverage 0.171*** 0.228*** 0.268*** 0.047 0.219*** 0.193*** 
 
(0.057) (0.064) (0.075) (0.133) (0.060) (0.063) 
High Tech 
Dummy 0.037** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.036** 0.063*** 0.030* 
 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Herfindahl Index -0.146 0.684*** -0.138 0.492* -0.051 0.724* 
 
(0.329) (0.259) (0.443) (0.268) (0.265) (0.375) 
Industry SOE 
Structure 1.184 -1.101 -0.295 0.650 1.006 -1.297 
 
(0.892) (1.048) (1.122) (0.844) (0.851) (1.098) 
Constant -0.451 1.181 0.554 -0.217 -0.616 1.808* 
 
(0.816) (1.003) (1.057) (0.772) (0.798) (1.025) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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N 4084 4094 4172 4006 4145 4033 




Table 12: Subsets of Data by Balance Sheet Variables 
This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining effect of state ownership on innovation efficiency for firms with firm characteristics regarding agency issue. Column 
(1), (3), (5), and (7) include all subsample firms with more tangible assets, more intangible assets, high capital expenditures, and high cash holdings, respectively, and low levels for columns (2), 
(4), (6), and(8). The dependent variable is the innovation efficiency; the main explanatory variable is SOE Dummy. The regressions control for the logarithm of total asset, firm age, Tobin’s Q, 
return on asset (ROA), cash flow, leverage, tangible assets, and capital expenditure (CAPEX), high-tech dummy, Herfindahl index, industry SOE structure as well as year and level-2 industry 
code, provided by China Security Regulation Commission (CSRC), fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Table 1. . Standard errors clustered at industry level are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Innovative Efficiency 
 
Tangible Assets Intangible Assets Capital Expenditure Cash Holding 
 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SOE Dummy 0.044*** 0.029* 0.040*** 0.033** 0.027 0.050*** 0.018 0.053*** 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.021 0.022* 0.009 0.027** 0.024* 0.012 0.017 0.022 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.013* -0.008 -0.013** -0.008 -0.002 -0.019*** -0.001 -0.018** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Lag(Tobin's Q) -0.011** -0.003 -0.005 -0.009* -0.011** -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) 
SalesGrowth -0.009 -0.008 -0.017 -0.001 -0.024 0.003 0.008 -0.028 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) 
ROA -0.322 -0.424 0.229 -1.339** -0.360 -0.730 -0.096 -1.027** 
 
(0.390) (0.485) (0.330) (0.641) (0.347) (0.684) (0.382) (0.501) 
Cash Flow 0.170 0.318 -0.252 1.027* 0.320 0.493 -0.152 0.988** 
 
(0.379) (0.472) (0.327) (0.623) (0.331) (0.698) (0.363) (0.495) 




(0.068) (0.131) (0.053) (0.078) (0.053) (0.084) (0.060) (0.067) 
Leverage 0.168*** 0.250*** 0.197*** 0.216*** 0.219*** 0.204*** 0.167*** 0.254*** 
 
(0.055) (0.071) (0.055) (0.069) (0.057) (0.067) (0.059) (0.063) 
High Tech Dummy 0.031* 0.058*** 0.036** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.075*** 0.024 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Herfindahl Index 0.069 0.464 0.367 0.239 0.062 0.602 0.115 0.514 
 
(0.323) (0.322) (0.445) (0.250) (0.250) (0.384) (0.252) (0.404) 
Industry SOE Structure 0.056 -0.036 1.524* -1.420 0.468 -0.258 0.537 -1.123 
 
(0.819) (1.045) (0.921) (1.023) (0.859) (1.106) (0.775) (1.284) 
Constant 0.480 0.343 -0.844 1.722* -0.172 0.874 -0.255 1.563 
 
(0.784) (0.957) (0.856) (0.959) (0.816) (1.014) (0.710) (1.212) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4177 4001 4254 3924 4250 3928 4058 4120 
adj. R-sq 0.066 0.077 0.070 0.078 0.073 0.070 0.097 0.058 
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Table 13: Controlling for Other Government Subsidies 
In this table, we report the baseline results of the OLS regression in Table 2includingsubsidies received from the 
government (Subsidies). The dependent variables in column (1) and (3) are innovation efficiency based in SIPO, 
while columns (2) and (4) use CSMAR. Innovation efficiency is defined by using the number of patent application 
that is eventually granted divided by the R&D Expense from previous years. The main independent variable is an 
SOE Dummy that equals one, if a firm’s ultimate controlling shareholders are the state or government agents in 
year t, and zero otherwise. It controls the logarithm of total asset, firm age, Tobin’s Q, return on asset (ROA), cash 
flow, leverage, tangible assets, capital expenditure (CAPEX), as well as year and level-2 industry code, provided 
by the China Security Regulation Commission (CSRC) andfixed effects for year and industry. Standard errors 
clustered at industry level are reported in parentheses. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the 
Table 1 and ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Innov. Eff. Innov. Eff. 
(CSMAR) 
Innov. Eff. Innov. Eff. 
(CSMAR) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SOE Dummy 0.035*** 0.054*** 0.033*** 0.064*** 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) 




  Subsidies/lag(R&D) 
  
0.009*** 0.013*** 
   
(0.002) (0.002) 
Log(Firm Age) 0.019** 0.008 0.009 -0.003 
 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.009** -0.034*** -0.016*** -0.041*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Lag(Tobin's Q) -0.008** -0.012*** -0.002 -0.009** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SalesGrowth -0.013 -0.019 -0.025** -0.041*** 
 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) 
ROA -0.514* -0.018 -0.530* 0.063 
 
(0.303) (0.381) (0.288) (0.369) 
Cash Flow 0.357 -0.277 0.470 -0.233 
 
(0.298) (0.382) (0.288) (0.382) 
Tangibility -0.113*** -0.038 -0.101*** -0.048 
 
(0.043) (0.058) (0.037) (0.051) 
Leverage 0.203*** 0.189*** 0.143*** 0.130*** 
 
(0.043) (0.052) (0.038) (0.043) 
High Tech Dummy 0.043*** 0.059*** 0.035*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) 
Herfindahl Index 0.268 0.191 0.095 -0.060 
 
(0.221) (0.179) (0.257) (0.189) 
Industry SOE Structure 0.100 -0.008 -0.804 -0.452 
 
(0.688) (0.672) (0.793) (0.784) 
Constant 0.306 0.890 0.978 1.395** 
 
(0.642) (0.633) (0.679) (0.672) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8178 8178 6935 6935 
adj. R-sq 0.071 0.043 0.090 0.080 
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Table 14: The Impact of Partial Privatization on Patents 
This table reports the results of the DiD regressions designed for testing the effect of privatization on innovation 
(patents), not innovation efficiency. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. The sample period is 2002-
2013.  R&D expenses are not included as they are not available for these sample years.  After is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for the years after partial privatization in 2005.  Standard errors clustered at the industry level are 
reported in parentheses. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Table 1 and ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 







SOE*After 0.093** 0.035 0.124** 0.138** 
 
(0.037) (0.045) (0.058) (0.070) 
SOE Dummy 0.039 0.092* -0.052 0.004 
 
(0.043) (0.049) (0.062) (0.078) 
After 0.326*** 0.348*** -0.230** -0.283** 
 
(0.062) (0.074) (0.091) (0.111) 
Leverage -0.013 -0.059 0.086 0.138* 
 
(0.057) (0.069) (0.061) (0.080) 
Tangibility 0.020 0.028 0.104 0.046 
 
(0.054) (0.067) (0.069) (0.093) 
ROA 0.201** 0.273** -0.173* 0.046 
 
(0.085) (0.106) (0.100) (0.131) 
Sales Growth 0.010 0.024* -0.041*** -0.029** 
 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
Log(Age) 0.027 0.107* 0.415*** 0.654*** 
 
(0.047) (0.057) (0.071) (0.089) 
Log(Sales) 0.027*** 0.021** 0.078*** 0.096*** 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) 
Constant -0.292* 0.043 -1.708*** -1.811*** 
 
(0.167) (0.194) (0.270) (0.351) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 14456 14456 14456 14456 
adj. R-sq 0.196 0.243 0.326 0.299 
 
 
